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One of the most puzzling contrasts between observed behavior and the 
implications of standard economic theory is the fact that, at least in 
the United States, few elderly individuals purchase life annuities. The 
conventional life-cycle model, based  on the appealing  concept that 
people save so as to smooth their consumption over their lifetimes, 
suggests that elderly retired individuals would seek to dissave out of 
their available resources as their remaining life expectancy shortens. 
Instead, observed age-wealth profiles among the elderly are more nearly 
flat.  Given the uncertainty  associated with any individual’s life ex- 
pectancy, this reluctance to dissave would be a natural consequence 
of risk aversion if  individuals could not avoid that risk by buying an- 
nuities. Since a well-developed individual life annuity market does exist 
in the United States, however, the challenge is to explain why so few 
people actually avail themselves of it.2 
In an earlier paper, the authors offered an explanation for this phe- 
nomenon based on a combination of the cost of annuities and a bequest 
m~tive.~  Annuities are costly, in the first instance, because the insurer 
must price them to defray ordinary costs of doing business and then 
earn a  competitive profit.  In  addition,  the typical individual  in  the 
population finds annuities even more costly because of adverse selec- 
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tion-in  other words, the tendency of longer-lived people to buy more 
annuities than people facing shorter life expectancies.  Both kinds of 
costs understandably discourage the purchase of individual life annu- 
ities within the context of the familiar life-cycle model. By contrast, if 
individuals choose not to buy annuities because they have accumulated 
wealth to leave to their heirs, rather than to finance their own con- 
sumption after retirement,  then the life-cycle model-and  with it, a 
variety of  well-known implications for economic behavior  and eco- 
nomic policy-fails  to withstand scrutiny. The principal finding of the 
authors’ earlier research was that during the early years of retirement 
the observed cost of annuities can independently account for the ab- 
sence of purchases of individual life annuities, while at older ages the 
combination of the observed cost of annuities and a bequest motive of 
plausible magnitude can account for this phenomenon. 
The object of this paper is to experiment with an alternative form of 
the authors’ earlier analysis by  representing the cost of  annuities as 
the (positive) differential between the premium on an annuity and its 
implicit expected value, rather than as the (negative) differential be- 
tween the implicit expected yield on an annuity and the available yield 
on alternative forms of wealth holding. Given the inverse relationship 
between price and yield for any fixed-income investment vehicle, in 
principle these two forms of analysis are simply the duals of one an- 
other. The difference here stems from the need to compromise with 
reality in order to investigate the implications of life annuities within 
the context of a readily tractable model of the consumption-saving and 
portfolio-allocation decisions. In effect, the analysis both here and in 
the authors’ earlier paper represents these annuities as if  they were 
one-year contracts. Here, however, the analysis represents the cost of 
annuities as a one-time proportional charge to enter a market in which 
actuarially fair annuities are available, while in the earlier paper this 
cost consists of a continual unfairness in the pricing of the (one-year) 
annuity contracts. One advantage of the approach taken here is that, 
because large short-sales of annuities are no longer optimal, the non- 
negativity constraint that was necessary in the earlier paper is no longer 
required. Because these formulations of the problem imply alternative 
opportunity sets, the results given by the two approaches differ. 
Section 2.1 presents raw data on the prices of individual life annuities 
sold in the United States during 1968-83, together with transformations 
of those data that  correspond to familiar concepts in  economic dis- 
cussions of  consumption-saving behavior. Section 2.2 reviews the model 
of consumption-saving and portfolio-allocation  behavior, for an indi- 
vidual with  an  uncertain  lifetime,  developed in the authors’ earlier 
paper. Section 2.3 uses simulations of this model, based on the observed 
pricing of annuities, to draw inferences about the respective roles of 55  Annuity Prices and Saving Behavior in the United States 
annuity costs and a bequest motive in accounting for the typical elderly 
retired individual’s preference for maintaining a flat age-wealth profile 
instead oE  buying annuities. Section 2.4 briefly summarizes the paper’s 
principal findings and reemphasizes some limitations that apply to the 
analysis here as well as to the authors’ earlier work. 
2.1  Prices of Individual Life Annuities 
Table 2.1 presents data for 1968-83, compiled from successive annual 
issues of the A. M. Best Flitcraft  Compend, on the per-dollar prices 
of guaranteed single-premium immediate annuities offered in the United 
States for 65-year-old males. In each case the value shown is the price 
(premium) charged to purchase a stream of payments equaling $1 per 
month, to begin in the month immediately following the purchase and 
to continue for the life of the annuitant. 
Column 1 of table 2.1 indicates the mean premium charged on this 
basic annuity contract by the ten largest insurance companies in the 
United States. These data are probably the most relevant for analyzing 
economy-wide individual behavior. The largest insurers usually do busi- 
ness in all regions of  the country, so that the typical 65-year-old U.S. 
male has access to annuities at this mean price with little or no search 
costs. As would be expected, the average annuity premium has fallen 
over time, as the effect of rising interest rates has predominated over 
the effect of increasing life expectancy. 
Table 2.1  Premiums for Immediate $1 Monthly Life Annuities 
Ten Largest Insurers  Complete 
Sample 
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The remaining columns of table 2.1 indicate the potential returns to 
market search by showing the dispersion of premiums charged for this 
same basic contract by different  insurer^.^ Columns 2 and 3 show data 
for the highest and lowest premiums charged for this contract by any 
of the ten largest insurers. Presumably most 65-year-old males have 
access to the lowest premium in this group at only modest search cost. 
Column 4 shows the lowest premium charged for this contract by any 
of the fifty-odd insurers in Best’s sample. Because the smaller com- 
panies in the sample do not necessarily maintain sales forces in all parts 
of the country, however, there is no presumption that the typical 65- 
year-old male has ready access to this complete-sample  lowest premium. 
Table 2.2 presents calculations of  the present expected value of an 
immediate $1 monthly annuity for the life of  a 65-year-old male. The 
two key ingredients in such calculations, of  course, are the assumed 
interest rate and the assumed structure of mortality probabilities.5 The 
table reports annual calculations of  present expected value based on 
two different interest rates, the 20-year U.S.  government bond yield 
and the average yield on corporate debt directly placed with major life 
insurance companies. In the calculations underlying columns 1 and 2, 
the assumed mortality probabilities are the general population mortality 
probabilities for 65-year-old males reported in the 1970 and 1980 U.S. 
Life Tables, adjusted by a factor of  .985 to reflect the 1.5 percent annual 
Table 2.2  Present Expected Values of $1 Monthly Life Annuities 
General Population  Annuity Purchasers 
Government  Direct  Government  Direct 
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improvement  in U.S. male mortality probabilities  that  has occurred 
over the last two decades, and by a further factor of  .9925 to reflect 
the assumption of a future 0.75 percent annual improvement in  male 
mortality probabilities for all ages.6 
Which of the two interest rates used  in table 2.2 is most relevant 
depends upon the perspective taken in the analysis. From the stand- 
point of the actuarial “fair” value to an insurer who has access to (and 
typically owns) direct placement securities, the associated higher yield 
is the correct one to choose. Alternatively, from the standpoint of an 
individual’s opportunity cost of funds, the lower yield on U.S. gov- 
ernment bonds is relevant if  the individual has no better investment 
vehicle. Because direct placements bear higher yields than do govern- 
ment bonds, the present expected values calculated using this yield are 
smaller than the corresponding values calculated using the government 
bond yield. Nevertheless, the present expected values calculated on 
either basis, including the government bond yield, are always smaller 
than even the lowest premium charged in the same year by any insurer 
in Best’s sample. 
If all individuals had identical mortality probabilities, a comparison 
between the calculated present expected values shown in columns 1 
and 2 of table 2.2 and the actual premiums shown in table 2.1 would 
indicate the “load factor” by which the pricing of these annuities differs 
from their fair actuarial value.  In fact, many individuals have infor- 
mation that leads them to expect either a shorter or a longer life than 
the population-wide average. Insurers, however, typically charge a uni- 
form premium to all individuals of  the same age and sex, presumably 
because information about individual mortality probabilities is either 
impossible or too costly to obtain and use. Individuals expecting longer 
(shorter) than average lifespans will therefore perceive life annuities 
as more (less) attractively priced, and hence will be more (less) likely 
to buy them.’ This adverse selection-adverse  from the viewpoint of 
the insurer, that is-will  lead to underwriting losses if the insurer con- 
tinues to charge a premium that is actuarially fair to the population as 
a whole. 
Columns 3 and 4 of table 2.2 therefore present the results of further 
annual calculation  of  the present  expected value  of  the same basic 
annuity contract for a 65-year-old male, based on the same two interest 
rates as before, but now based on alternative mortality probabilities 
compiled from the actual company experience on individual life annuity 
contracts issued in the United States during 1971-75,  again adjusted 
as indicated above to reflect the improvement in mortality probabili- 
ties.s Figure 2.1 illustrates the extent to which the subpopulation who 
choose to buy annuities in fact have a greater survival probability than 
the general population. Because of  this greater life expectancy, the 58  Benjamin M. FriedmadMark  Warshawsky 
Survival  probability 
Age X 
Fig. 2.1  Probability of survival to age X  for males at age 65 in 1970. 
present  expected values  shown in columns 3  and 4 of table 2.2 are 
greater than the corresponding values shown in columns 1 and 2, based 
on the same two interest  rates  but on general population mortality 
probabilities. For each year, however, even the greater values resulting 
from the actual company experience mortality probabilities  are still 
uniformly smaller than even the lowest corresponding premiums shown 
for that year in table 2.1. Even within the subpopulation who voluntarily 
buy annuities, therefore, the price is not actuarially fair. 
Table 2.3 summarizes the differences between the actual premiums 
charged on this basic annuity contract and the corresponding actuarially 
fair values by showing the  1968-83  average of the ratio of premium 
charged to present expected value for each of  the four premiums re- 
Table 2.3  Average  Load Factors on Life Annuity Premiums 
General Population  Annuity Purchasers 
Government  Direct  Government  Direct 
Premium  Bonds  Placements  Bonds  Placements 
Ten-Largest Mean  I .32  1.48  1.18  1.33 
Ten-Largest High  1.39  I .55  I .24  1.40 
Ten-Largest Low  I .24  I .39  1.11  1.25 
Complete-Sample Low  I .20  1.34  I .06  I .20 
NOTE: Calculations are for 65-year-old malcs. 59  Annuity Prices and Saving Behavior in the United States 
ported in table 2.1 and each of the four present expected value cal- 
culations reported in table 2.2. The resulting average load factors range 
from a low of 1.06 for the smallest premium charged by any company 
in Best’s sample, compared to the present expected value based on 
government  bond  yields  and  actual company  experience mortality 
probabilities, to a high of 1.55 for the largest premium charged by any 
of the ten largest insurers, compared to the present expected value 
based on direct placement yields and general population mortality tables. 
The comparisons in table 2.3 that are probably most relevant for 
studying economy-wide individual behavior are those shown in row  1 
for the mean premium charged by the ten largest insurers versus the 
present  expected  value  based  on either government bond  yields  or 
direct placement yields, and on either general population or company 
experience mortality probabilities. The load factor of 1.32, for the first 
case considered, means that a 65-year-old U.S. male, randomly  se- 
lected from that population, and for whom the government bond yield 
represents the opportunity cost of capital, typically pays $1.32 for each 
$1.00 of  expected  present  value  when  he  purchases a  life annuity. 
Among the (on average longer-lived) subpopulation of 65-year-old U .S. 
males who actually choose to buy life annuities, the load factor based 
on the same opportunity cost is only 1.18. In other words, of the 322 
per  dollar load factor to the general population,  142  represents the 
effect of adverse selection and the remaining  182 the combination of 
transaction costs, taxes, and profit to the insurer. If  the annuity pur- 
chaser’s opportunity cost of  capital is instead the direct placement 
yield-for  example, because of ability to buy  shares in packages of 
intermediated private securities-then  the load factor per dollar of ex- 
pected present value is 482, of which 152 represents the effect of ad- 
verse selection and the remaining 332 the insurer’s costs, taxes, and 
pr~fit.~  As the appendix shows, these results for 65-year-old males are 
similar to those for females or for males of different ages. 
The question for consumption-saving behavior, then, is whether an 
average load factor of  1.18 (or even 1.48) is sufficient to account for 
the small participation in the individual life annuity market in the United 
States. In short, do most elderly retired people choose not to consume 
out of their wealth, and therefore leave unintentional bequests, merely 
because they are reluctant to pay  $1.18 (or $1.48) for every $1.00 of 
present expected value of annuities? 
It is difficult to answer this question on the basis of casual evidence 
only. At first thought, a load factor of  this magnitude seems a large 
price to pay for pooling risk.  Nevertheless, it is not out of line with 
loads charged elsewhere in the insurance business, in product lines 
that almost everyone buys. For example, data from Best’s Key Rating 
Guide:  Property-Casualty indicate that the recent average load factor 
in premiums charged for property and casualty insurance written by 60  Benjamin M. FriedmadMark Warshawsky 
large companies has been  1.37-essentially the same as that on indi- 
vidual life annuities. 
Moreover, despite the apparently large load factor, individual life 
annuities are not a “dominated asset”  in  the sense that the cost per 
unit of  payoff, unadjusted for mortality probabilities, is greater than 
the analogous cost of alternative investment vehicles. Table 2.4 shows 
the present value of a 35-year certain $1 monthly annuity, calculated 
using the two interest rates used in tables 2.2 and 2.3 for each year 
during 1968-83.lO  As comparison to column 1 of table 2.1 shows, the 
value of the certain annuity based on the government bond yield ex- 
ceeded the mean premium on the life annuity charged by the ten largest 
insurers in  all years of the  sample except 1980-82,  while the value 
based  on the direct placement yield exceeded the mean premium in 
most years until 1979. 
Hence some more formal approach to this issue is necessary. Section 
2.2 develops a framework for such an analysis, and section 2.3 applies 
that framework in the context of  the premium  and load factor data 
reported here. 
2.2  A Model of Saving and Annuity Demand 
The model used in Friedman and Warshawsky (1985)11  to analyze 
the demand for individual life annuities in the context of  life-cycle 
saving and a bequest motive is an annuity analog of  Fischer’s (1973) 
model of the demand for life insurance, generalized to incorporate fixed 
mandatory holdings of socially provided annuities  .I2 The individual’s 
Table 2.4  Present Value of a 35-Year Certain $1 Monthly Annuity 
~~  ~________ 
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decision problem  in this expanded life-cycle  context is to maximize 
expected lifetime utility: 
(1) 
where w is the assumed maximum length of life, x is the individual’s 
age as of time t  = 0, pI  is the probability that an individual of age x  at 
t = 0 will be alive at any time t >  0, qt+ is the (conditional) probability 
that such an individual who was alive at time t will die at time t  + 1  ,I3 
U,(C,)  is utility received from consumption C at time t,  and V,+  I  (G,+ 
is  utility  received from (anticipation of) a bequest G at time  t  +  1. 
Following  Fischer (1973), it  is convenient to specify the two utility 
functions in the isoelastic form: 
w-x-  1 




1-P  u,  (C,) = -  *  a,  , 
where  P is the Pratt-Arrow coefficient  of relative  risk aversion, a  is 
the time preference parameter, and 6, (in comparison to al) indicates 
the relative utility attached to bequests left in period t. 
The usual life-cycle specification of behavior with no bequest motive 
is therefore just the special case of this model with b, = 0 for all t > 0. 
In general, however, people may value bequests, and they may value 
them differently  at different  times.  The application  of  the model  in 
section 2.3 below follows Yaari’s  (1965) suggestion that h, follows a 
hump-shaped pattern with higher values during the years when family 
dependency is important, so that b, is declining during retirement years 
when children have typically become independent. 
The individual’s  problem  is  to maximize  E(U) subject to a  given 
initial wealth position and to a nonnegativity  constraint on wealth  in 
each subsequent time period, given the menu of available investment 
opportunities (including any mandatory holding of  socially provided 
annuities) and their respective yields.  l4  In each period the individual 
must decide not only how much of current wealth to consume but also 
how to allocate the remainder among the available investment vehicles. 
The specific asset menu considered here includes a riskless one-period 
bond bearing gross rate of return R,, a one-period social annuity bearing 
gross rate of return Qf to survivors, and a one-period market annuity 
bearing gross rate of return Q;l  to survivors.I5 Both annuities are ac- 
tuarially fair-that  is, there is no load factor on either-if 62  Benjamin M. FriedmadMark Warshawsky 
With little relevant loss of generality, it is convenient to set R,  constant 
at R for all t > 0. 
The dynamic programming solution to this problem proceeds from 
the final period t = w -  x - 1, in which the certainty of death at the 
end of the period (q,,-, =  1)  simplifies the problem of  an individual 
who has survived to that date to merely choosing CW-,-  to maximize 
the sum of utility from current consumption U,,-,- I(CW-x-  1)  and utility 
from bequests V,,-,(G,,-,), subject to then-remaining  wealth  W,,-,- 
and the constraint 
(5)  G,,-x = R  *  (WW-,-l - C,,-,-l). 
Given the isoelastic utilities assumed in equations (2) and (3), the so- 
lution is just 
-  (6)  C,,-,-I  -  k,,.-,-i  *  W,-,-I  9 
where 
(7) 
and the corresponding indirect utility function, 
(8)  J1[W,,-,-,l  =  max  [U,,.  (C, x-l) + V,,-,  (G,,-JI  , 
is 
(9) 
ct, -1-  I 
where 
(10) 
The consumption decision in equation (5) represents the entire solution 
for t =  w  -x -  1, since in that period the availability of annuities is ir- 
relevant to the analysis. 
The dynamic programming solution next proceeds to  the individual's 
optimal consumption and portfolio decisions for the immediately prior 
period, given wealth  remaining  at that time.  An  individual  alive at 
t =  w -  x -  2 will die at the end of that period with probability q,,-,-, . 
Hence the relevant maximand governing the decisions to be taken as 
of  t  =  w  - x - 2  is  Uw-x-2(Cw-x-z)  plus  the  bequest  motive 
V,,-,- l(G,,-x-  1) with probability qW-,-  and the indirect utility function 
in equation (9) with probability (1 -  qw-x-l).  The indirect utility func- 
tion for t  = w  --x  - 2 is therefore 63  Annuity Prices and Saving Behavior in the United States 
where  A  and S  are the  proportions  of  saving (W - C)  invested  in 
market annuities and in (mandatory) social annuities, respectively. The 
usual life-cycle model with no market for annuities is therefore just the 
special case represented by A, = 0 for all t 2 0 (and, if  there are no 
social annuities either, S, = 0 for all t 2 0 also).I6 
The first order conditions for equation  (1 I) then give  the optimal 
values of  consumption and purchases of  market annuities at t  =  w 
- x-2  as 
(12) 
and 
-  c,+-2  - 8;lixp-  2 ' ww-x-2 
L-2  9 
- 
and the corresponding value of the indirect utility function as 
(14)  J2[Ww  x-21  = sn.-.r-2  *  Wna-x-2  7 
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The remainder of the dynamic programming solution proceeds back- 
ward to the initial period r  = 0 in an analogous way. The expressions 
for each period’s optimal consumption and purchases of market an- 
nuities, and for each period’s value of the indirect utility function, are 
of the same form (but with subscripts adjusted accordingly) as equations 
(12), (13), and (14), respectively. 
2.3  Simulation Results 
The model developed in  section 2.2 generates  lifetime streams of 
consumption  and annuity purchase values that are optimal for given 
values of parameters describing preferences (p, a,  and h),  the market 
environment (R,  QA,  and Qy), and mortality probabilities  (p  and 4). 
The principal focus of  interest in this paper is on one aspect of pref- 
erences and one aspect of the market environment-the  bequest motive 
and the availability of market annuities, respectively. 
The strategy adopted here for representing the bequest motive (con- 
fronting a 65-year-old male) follows Fischer (1973) by assuming that b, 
in equation (3) varies according to 
(17)  6, = (1.04 -  .Olt)  8,  r=0,  ...,  35  , 
where 8 is a non-age-specific parameter indicating the individual’s life- 
long preference for bequests relative to current consumption, given the 
other parameters of the model, including in particular the interest rate 
(R),  the curvature of the utility function (p), and-because  8 implicitly 
gives the relative weight of a stock (the bequest) versus a flow (con- 
sumption)-the  assumed time unit of analysis. For any given value of 
8, however, 6, declines linearly with  t.I7  Given 8 and b,, the bequest 
amount is larger as R is higher, and smaller as p is higher. For example, 
from  equations (347) and (17), 8 takes the value (Gw-x/Cw-x-l)B  . 
(.69)/R,  where (Gw-x/C,,-x-l)  is just the ratio of the final-period bequest 
to the prior-period  consumption.  The normally  limiting case for al- 
truistic bequests, in which an individual provides for his heirs’ con- 
sumption at the same level as his own, indicates (1/R - 1)@  . (.69)/R 
as the logical upper bound on 8.18 In the simulations reported below, 
the strength of the bequest motive is indicated initially by 8, and sub- 
sequently by  the corresponding bequedsaving ratio (G,,-x/C,,-x-  1), 
given the other assumed parameters. 
The strategy used here to represent the market for private annuities 
follows Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) by assuming that private annuities 
are either available at the actuarially fair price Q”  = R/(1 - q), or, 
alternatively, not available at all (A = 0). The object of the analysis, 
therefore, is to determine what  load factor an individual  would  be 
willing to pay in order to have access to market annuities under the 65  Annuity Prices and Saving Behavior in the United States 
assumed values of all of the model’s other parameters. By comparing 
this critical load factor with the typical load factors summarized in table 
2.3, in light of the observation that in fact very few individuals actually 
purchase life annuities, it is then possible to assess the reasonableness 
of the assumed values of the model’s other parameters-including,  in 
particular, the strength of the bequest motive. 
This treatment of the cost of annuities captures the chief implications 
of  the fact that, although the model in principle refers to one-period 
annuities, in fact the annuities available for purchase are life annuities. 
Even when an individual makes monthly annuity purchases over time, 
as in many defined contribution retirement plans, what he is buying 
each month  is an additional life annuity.  It is therefore plausible to 
treat the load factors on annuity premiums shown in table 2.3 in a lump- 
sum fashion, not as a load to be repeated in every period. 
The simplest place to begin is the special case of the model developed 
in section 2.2 corresponding to the standard life-cycle model with nei- 
ther bequest motive nor  Social Security (which is equivalent to the 
model in Kotlikoff and Spivak [1981]). Table 2.5 summarizes the results 
of  two simulations of the model, both based on the assumptions that 
6,  = 0 and S,  = 0 for all  t. As in  Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), the 
assumed time preference parameter is a = .99, and the assumed market 
interest rate is constant at R = 1.01. The assumed coefficient of relative 
risk aversion is /3  = 4.j9  The assumed mortality probabilities are those 
for a 65-year-old male reported in the 1980 U.S. Life Tables, adjusted 
as described in section 2.1. For each simulation, table 2.5 shows the 
relevant solution values for the initial year (age 65) and every fifth year 
thereafter until the assumed maximum life span (age 110). 
Table 2.5  Simulation Results for the Standard Life-Cycle Model 
No Annuities  Annuities Available 
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year-old  males.  Values  are percentages of  initial  wealth.  Annuity values are present 
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The first simulation considered within this traditional life-cycle con- 
text represents the case in which market annuities (like social annuities 
here) are unavailable. The individual's  only choice is therefore how 
much  to consume in  each period, since the unconsumed portion of 
initial wealth is automatically  invested in one-year bonds. Column  1 
of table 2.5 shows the optimal age-consumption profile, while column 
2  shows the corresponding implied profile  of remaining wealth  (con- 
sisting entirely of bonds), with both sets of values stated as percentages 
of initial wealth. These simulated values immediately indicate the im- 
portant contrast between  reality  and this set of assumptions, in that 
they show the optimality of a declining age-consumption profile and a 
sharply declining age-wealth profile-phenomena  not observed in avail- 
able data. 
The second simulation within this traditional life-cycle context, sum- 
marized in columns 3-5  of table 2.5, shows that simply relaxing the 
assumption that market annuities are unavailable avoids this strikingly 
counterfactual result only at the expense of leading to another. This 
simulation differs from  the first one in assuming that individual life 
annuities are available in the private market at an actuarially fair price 
[Q" = R/(1 -  q)],  and the table reports values for optimal consumption 
as well  as optimal  wealth  holdings  in bonds and annuities, respec- 
tively.20  In this case, the individual's optimal course of action is to  hold 
no bonds at all but to stabilize the age-consumption  profile  almost 
completely by investing all wealth in annuities. The implied flat age- 
consumption profile is roughly consistent with the available evidence, 
but  the  implied  large  demand  for  market  annuities  is  sharply 
counterfactual. 
Following Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), it is possible to infer the lump- 
sum value to the individual, under the conditions assumed in the sim- 
ulations reported in table 2.5, of having access to a market for actu- 
arially fair life annuities.  From equation (14),  the initial value of the 
indirect utility function in each simulation is 
for given initial wealth W,,.  The proportional increment in the individ- 
ual's initial wealth required to render the individual as well off, in the 
sense of  an equal initial value of the indirect  utility function, in the 
absence of an annuity market as with such a market is therefore just 67  Annuity Prices and Saving Behavior in the United States 
where  S,lQ"  = R/(1  - q) is the value of  So in equation (18) in the 
simulation with a market for fair annuities, and ij01A  = 0 is the analogous 
value in the simulation with no annuity market. 
For the pair of  simulations reported in table 2.5, the calculation in 
equation (19) yields M = 1.13. Under the conditions assumed in these 
simulations, therefore, it would still be preferable to  put all initial wealth 
into annuities than to buy none at all, as long as the load factor did 
not exceed L*  = 2. 13.21  Because L* = 2.13 far exceeds the load factors 
in actual annuity prices calculated on any of the bases reported in table 
2.3, and yet in fact there is little individual demand for life annuities, 
some other assumption common to the two simulations shown in table 
2.5 must be importantly counterfactual. 
One possibility, of course, is that p = 4 overstates the coefficient of 
relative  risk  aversion.  Alternative  simulations  with  a  smaller  risk- 
aversion parameter  show that this is not  the source of the problem, 
however. Table 2.6 summarizes a pair of simulations that are identical 
to those reported in table 2.5 except for the new assumption p = 2.22 
Although the specific age-consumption and age-wealth profiles shown 
in table 2.6 differ somewhat from those in  table 2.5, the same coun- 
terfactual implications are again readily apparent. Indeed, because of 
the lower risk-aversion,  the optimal age-consumption and age-wealth 
profiles when annuities are unavailable decline even more sharply. When 
actuarially fair annuities are available, it is again optimal to invest all 
of initial wealth in them. Most importantly, even with lower risk aver- 
sion the proportional increment in initial wealth required to render the 
Table 2.6  Simulation Results for the Standard Life-Cycle Model (Low Risk 
Aversion) 
No Annuities  Annuities Available 
Age  Consumption  Bonds  Consumption  Bonds  Annuities 
65  5.25% 
70  4.81 
75  4.26 
80  3.58 
8.5  2.79 
90  1.96 
95  I .20 
I00  .63 
105  .29 
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individual as well off in the absence of an annuity market as with such 
a market is still M  = .88. Even with lower risk aversion, therefore, it 
would still be preferable to put all of initial wealth into annuities rather 
than to buy none at all, as long as the load factor did not exceed L* 
=  1.88-a  critical value again well in excess of  any of  the observed 
load factors reported in table 2.3. 
A further possible explanation for the counterfactual results in both 
tables 2.5 and 2.6 is that Social Security not only exists but is a large 
part of wealth for most individuals. Table 2.7 presents a pair of sim- 
ulations of the more general model developed in section 2.2-first  with- 
out, and then with, a market for actuarially fair annuities-based  on 
the assumption that actuarially fair Social Security constitutes half of 
total wealth (S  = .5).23  In all other respects, including the absence of 
a bequest motive, these simulations are analogous to those reported 
in table 2.5. 
The results shown in table 2.7 again exhibit largely the same coun- 
terfactual patterns as in table 2.5 and, therefore, suggest that merely 
allowing for Social Security cannot account for the observed behavior. 
In the absence of  an annuities market, the optimal age-consumption 
and especially age-wealth profiles decline fairly sharply, although not 
so much as in table 2.5. If actuarially fair annuities are available, it is 
optimal to invest all of total wealth other than Social Security in pur- 
chasing them. Most importantly, even with a sizeable role for Social 
Security, the proportional initial wealth increment required to render 
the individual as well off without as with a private annuity market is 
M  = .33. Hence it would still be preferable to put all of total wealth 
other than Social Security (that is, one-half of total wealth) into private 
Table 2.7  Simulation Results for the Model Including Social Security 
No Annuities  Annuities Available 
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annuities rather than buy none at all, as long as the annuity load factor 
did not exceed L*  = 1.66 =  1  + (.33/.5)-again  far greater than the 
load factors actually observed. An analogous simulation based on the 
lower risk-aversion value of  p = 2 (not shown in the table) produces 
almost identical results, with M = .31 and a critical load factor L*  = 
1.62. 
The potential explanation for the observed behavior that is of greatest 
interest in the context of  this paper is that, in general, people may 
value  not just their  own  consumption but  also bequests.  Table 2.8 
presents three further pairs of simulations of the fully general model 
developed in section 2.2, in each case based on the same assumptions 
as in table 2.7 (including the prominent role for Social Security) and, 
in addition, a positive bequest motive. The first of these three pairs of 
simulations assumes the bequest motive 8 = 2, which is quite modest 
given the stock-flow dimension of 8 and the model’s use of an annual 
time unit, and p = 4. The second pair of simulations assumes 8 = 8, 
the third 8 = 24. 
The simulation results reported in table 2.8 show that even a very 
modest bequest motive is sufficient to eliminate one of the importantly 
counterfactual aspects of the earlier simulations. In particular, because 
of the bequest motive it is no longer optimal to invest all of total wealth 
other than Social Security in private annuities. The fraction of wealth 
invested in bonds varies positively  with the strength of  the bequest 
motive, but even 8  = 2 is sufficient to make optimal bond holdings 
neither zero nor trivially small. Moreover, optimal bond holdings do 
not decrease (until the final year they actually increase slightly) with 
age. Hence the general model, with even a modest positive bequest 
motive, is consistent with observed behavior in implying an approxi- 
mately flat age-wealth profile for the part of wealth held in nonannuity 
form. 
By contrast, the results for all three pairs of simulations shown in 
table 2.8 continue to be counterfactual in implying that, when private 
annuities are available, it  is optimal to use a large fraction  of  total 
wealth other than Social Security to purchase them. Further analysis, 
however, indicates that here the load factor in  annuity pricing is po- 
tentially very important. 
For the weak bequest motive 8 = 2, the proportional initial wealth 
increment required to render the individual as well off without as with 
a private annuity market is M = .22. The critical load factor necessary 
to make buying no annuities at all preferable to investing 41  percent 
of initial wealth in annuities is there L*  = 1.53 = 1 + (.22/.41), again 
above the observed  load factors reported  in table 2.3 for the mean 
premiums charged by the ten largest insurers, regardless of the mor- 
tality probabilities and the interest rates used in the calculations. 70  Benjamin M. FriedmadMark  Warshawsky 
Table 2.8  Simulation Results for the General Model 
No Annuities  Annuities Available 
Age  Consumption  Soc. Sec.  Bonds  Consumption  Soc. Sec.  Bonds  Annuities 
- 
H=2 
65  5.80%) 
7  0  5.68 
75  5.51 
80  5.28 
85  4.97 
90  4.57 
95  4.08 
100  3.54 
105  3.04 
I10  .  00 
0=8 
65  5.78% 
70  5.66 
75  5.49 
80  5.27 
85  4.96 
90  4.58 
95  4.12 
I00  3.66 
105  3.29 
110  .OO 
H  = 24 
65  5.76% 
70  5.64 
75  5.47 
80  5.25 
85  4.96 
90  4.60 
95  4.22 
I00  3.89 
I05  3.76 
I10  .  00 
50.00%  50.00% 
41.64  41.64 
33.87  33.87 
26.86  26.86 
20.69  20.69 
15.61  15.61 
11.61  11.61 
8.54  8.54 
5.79  5.79 
.OO  3.18 
50.00%  50.00% 
41.67  41.67 
33.95  33.95 
26.99  26.99 
20.90  20.90 
15.93  15.93 
12.10  12.10 
9.30  9.30 
6.94  6.94 
.OO  5.57 
50.00%  50.00% 
41.75  41.75 
34.12  34.12 
27.27  27.27 
21.31  21.31 
16.55  16.55 
13.02  13.02 
10.65  10.65 
8.90  8.90 


















































.  00 
50.00% 
42.78 


















I  I .76% 
11.76 














































-  1.12 
.OO 
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S  = .5. Calculations are for 65-year-old males. Values are percentages of initial wealth. 
Annuity  values are present expected values. 
For 8 = 8, the initial wealth increment required to render the indi- 
vidual as well off without as with a private annuity market is only M = 
.18, so that the critical load factor that would make buying no annuities 
at all preferable to investing 38 percent of initial wealth in annuities is 
L*  = 1.47. As table 2.3 shows, this load factor is approximately equal 
to that charged on average by the largest ten insurers if the underlying 
present expected value calculation relies on general population  mor- 71  Annuity Prices and Saving Behavior in the United States 
tality probabilities and the interest rate on corporate direct placements. 
Nevertheless, it still exceeds the implied load factor confronting an 
individual who knows that his mortality probabilities are characteristic 
of other annuity purchasers, or whose opportunity cost of funds is the 
government  bond  yield  (or  who  searches  for  the  lowest  available 
premium). 
Finally, for 8 = 24, the initial wealth increment required to render 
the individual as well off without as with a private annuity market is 
M  =  .14. Hence the critical load factor that would make buying no 
annuities at all preferable to investing 35 percent of  initial wealth in 
annuities is L*  =  1.40, about in the middle between the actual load 
factor based on general population mortality probabilities and the direct 
placement  yield  and  the  actual  load  factor  based  on  alternative 
assumptions. 
Under  some sets of  plausible assumptions, therefore, importantly 
including a positive bequest motive, the actual load factor included in 
the premiums on individual life annuities sold in  the United States is 
sufficient to make people prefer buying no annuities at all over buying 
the amount that would be optimal  if  annuity prices  were actuarially 
fair. Although this finding is hardly without interest, since it indicates 
a joint  role  for the  bequest  motive  and for annuity  load  factors  in 
explaining the observed behavior, it still does not fully explain the fact 
that almost no one buys any individual life annuities. Nothing forces 
people to choose between buying either the amount of annuities that 
would be optimal at actuarially fair prices or buying none at all. Hence 
showing under what conditions people would prefer no annuities at all 
to the amount they would purchase at actuarially fair prices still does 
not  establish the conditions under  which they would  not  buy  some 
amount that is significant albeit less than the actuarially fair optimum. 
For the assumed values of a,  R,  p, and S  underlying the simulations 
reported in table 2.8, for example, and for an assumed annuity load 
factor of  L  = 1.40 (the critical value for 8 = 24), the strength of the 
bequest  motive required  to make the individual indifferent  between 
purchasing  private annuities equal to  1 percent of initial wealth  (in- 
cluding Social Security) and purchasing  none  at all  is  8  =  343-far 
above 8  = 24, yet still below the logical upper bound for 8 given the 
assumed parameter values. Table 2.9 summarizes the results of  anal- 
ogous simulations based on various values of  S, R,  and p, reporting 
in each case the value of  8 that renders the individual just indifferent 
between investing 1 percent of initial wealth (including Social Security) 
in private annuities and purchasing none at all when the load factor is 
L  = 1.40.24 
Both because the quantitative importance of bequests in overall sav- 
ing is a question with major implications for both positive and normative 72  Benjamin M. FriedmadMark Warshawsky 
Table 2.9  Bequest Motive Strength Needed to Eliminate Annuity Purchases 
s = .4  s = .5  S = .6 


























NOTES:  Values shown are  for 8,  just sufficient to eliminate initial annuity purchases equal 
to 1 percent of  initial wealth. Assumed values (other than S, R, and p as shown) are 
a  =  .99 and L  =  1.40. Calculations are for 65-year-old males. 
issues,25  and because there is little other way to evaluate the plausibility 
of values of 8 within the logically admissible range, it is interesting to 
see just how large these results suggest that the typical bequest should 
be. Table 2.10 shows, for each of the combinations of parameter values 
considered in table 2.9, and in each case for the value of the bequest 
motive parameter  8 (as shown in  table 2.9)  needed to render the in- 
dividual indifferent between  investing  1 percent  of  initial wealth  in 
private annuities and purchasing none at all when the load factor is L 
= 1.40, the corresponding bequestkonsumption ratio (Gw-x/Cw-x-  ,). 
For the most part these estimates are closely bunched, despite the wide 
variation  in  the underlying  parameter  values,  typically  indicating  a 
bequest equal to 2-4  times the final year’s consumption.  Especially 
for the lower end of the range, these estimates appear to be empirically 
plausible.  26 
Table 2.10  Ratio of  Expected  Bequest to Final  Period Consumption 
s =  .4  s =  .5  S  =  .6 
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NOTES:  Values shown are ratios of expected bequest to final period consumption, given 
0 just large enough to eliminate initial  annuity purchases equal to 1 percent of  initial 
wealth. Assumed values (other than S, R,  and p as shown) are a  =  .99 and L  =  I .40. 
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Given the respective roles of S, R, and p in affecting the demand 
for annuities in the model developed in section 2.2, their corresponding 
roles here in determining the strength of bequest motive necessary to 
eliminate that demand (for a given load factor) is straightforward. The 
demand for individual life annuities is  smaller as Social Security is 
more important, smaller as the rate of return is higher, and greater as 
people are more risk averse. Hence the bequest motive implied by the 
fact that few people buy individual life annuities is weaker as Social 
Security is more important, weaker as the rate of return is higher, and 
stronger as people are more risk averse. 
In sum, the results shown in tables 2.9 and 2.10  indicate that for 
plausible sets of assumed parameter values the combination of an an- 
nuity load factor in the observed range (see again table 2.3) and an 
empirically plausible positive bequest motive in the theoretically ad- 
missible range for altruistic bequests is sufficient to explain the absence 
of purchases of individual life annuities. This finding lends strength to 
the view that desired bequests are an important element in consumption- 
saving behavior. Moreover, when Social Security is less important and 
people are more risk averse, the bequest motive assumes an especially 
large role in explaining why so few people buy annuities. Under these 
circumstances the indicated bequest is at least 4 times final consumption. 
2.4  Conclusion and Further Thoughts 
The observed reluctance of most individuals in the United States to 
buy individual life annuities, and the concommitant approximately flat 
average age-wealth profile, stand in sharp contradiction to the standard 
life-cycle model of consumption-saving behavior. The analysis in this 
paper lends support to an explanation for this phenomenon based on 
the interaction of an intentional bequest motive and annuity prices that 
are not actuarially fair. 
Premiums charged for individual life annuities in the United States do 
include a load factor of 32@-48@  per dollar, or 18@-33@  per dollar after 
allowing for adverse selection, in comparison to actuarially fair annuity 
values. Load factors of this size are not out of line with those on other 
familiar (and almost universally purchased) insurance products. Simu- 
lations of an extended model of life-cycle saving and portfolio behavior, 
allowing explicitly for uncertain lifetimes and Social Security, show that 
the load factor charged would have to be far larger than this to account 
for the observed behavior in the absence of a bequest motive. By con- 
trast, the combination of a load factor in this range and a positive be- 
quest motive can do so for some plausible values of the assumed un- 
derlying parameters. Moreover, if this combination of factors is leading 
elderly individuals to avoid purchasing life annuities, it implies a typical 
bequest that is fairly large in comparison to their annual consumption. 74  Benjamin M. FriedmadMark Warshawsky 
As  the  authors’  earlier work  has  already  emphasized,  caution  is 
appropriate in relying on these conclusions without further research. 
Although the model used here does generalize the standard life-cycle 
model in several potentially important ways, it still excludes a priori 
a variety of further possible explanations for the observed beha~ior.~’ 
First,  many people at least  say that they  choose stable age-wealth 
profiles, rather than either buying annuities or simply consuming out 
of wealth, not because of mortality considerations but from fear of the 
consequences of catastrophic illness. Second, while the analysis here 
follows the recent literature by implicitly working in real terms, the 
individual life annuities available in U.S.  markets guarantee specified 
nominal payments. Third, the analysis here does not allow for several 
more complex kinds of possible interactions within families, including, 
for example, either nonaltruistic (“manipulative”)  bequests or intra- 
family risk sharing.28  Finally, in contrast to the reliance here (and in 
just about all of the available literature on the subject) on the standard 
theory of expected utility maximization, there is evidence that, espe- 
cially when the prospect of rare events is involved, individuals sys- 
tematically overweight the probability of rare events.29 
These further possible explanations for the fact that few people pur- 
chase individual life annuities are subjects for future research. 
Appendix 
Average Load Factor for Life Annuity Premiums 
Premium 
General Population  Annuity Purchasers 
Government  Direct  Government  Direct 
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Notes 
1. See, for example, Mirer (1979) and Hubbard (1983). 
2.  The Retirement History Survey indicates that only 2 percent of the elderly 
population own individual annuities of any sort; see, for example, Friedman 
and Sjogren (1980). 
3.  See Friedman and Warshawsky (1985). 
4. This dispersion probably reflects search costs; see, for example, Pratt et 
al. (1979). Alternatively, it could reflect different marketing choices by different 
insurers. 
5.  The exact expression used is 
where w is the assumed maximum length of  life (here taken to be  110 years), 
x is the age at the date of issue (here 65 years), r is the relevant interest rate, 
and pxl  is the probability  that an  individual  of  age x  at the time  t  =  1  will 
survive to any year t > 1. These annual calculations are then converted to a 
monthly basis. 
6. The calculations rely on the 1970 tables for years 1968-70,  on  the 1980 
tables for years 1980-83,  and on both tables (weighted) for the years  1971- 
79. See Faber (1982) for a complete discussion  of the U.S. Life Tables, and 
Wetterstrand (1983) for a discussion of improvements in mortality probabilities. 
In the calculations for females summarized in the appendix, the corresponding 
adjustment factors are .98 and .99. 
7. See Rothschild  and Stiglitz (1976) for an analysis of the principles  un- 
derlying this kind of adverse selection. 
8. See Society of Actuaries (1983) for the actual company experience tables. 
9. This latter comparison  is the relevant  one from the perspective of the 
insurer.  Informal discussions  with the insurers suggest that, of this 33$ per 
dollar, roughly 11e reflected transaction costs (narrowly defined), 8$ taxes, and 
14$ return to capital at risk. This breakdown is at best only suggestive, however. 
10.  The small probability  that a 65-year-old male will survive past age 100 
is simply ignored for purposes of this comparison. 
11. This section draws heavily  on Friedman and Warshawsky (1985); see 
that paper for additional details and references to relevant literature. 
12.  In fact, Fischer’s model is really an annuity model, despite his application 
of it to the demand for life insurance. 
13.  Probabilities pr and  qrcl  are, of  course, conditional  on initial  age  x. 
Writing them as p(x), and  would be appropriate but would  clutter an 
already  cumbersome notation.  Conditionally on x is to be understood, here 
and below. 
14.  In a more general context it would also be necessary to take account of 
labor income.  The focus of  this  paper,  however,  is on the elderly  retired 
population. 
15.  As in Fischer (1973), the assumption of one-period annuities makes the 
analysis tractable.  The annuities actually available for purchase in the United 
States are instead life annuities. 
16. The model as written here imposes no nonnegativity constraint on  choice 
parameter A-that  is, it does not explicitly preclude short sales of annuities. 
For most reasonable values of the given parameters, however, large short sales 
are not optimal anyway. If they were, imposing a nonnegativity constraint in 
solving the model would be straightforward. 76  Benjamin M. FriedmadMark Warshawsky 
17. The time profile in equation (17) is from Fischer’s (1973) appendix table 
A2, extended to age 110. Reasoning analogous to that underlying Abel’s (1984) 
model of life insurance markets suggests that the results could be very sensitive 
to whether the value of bequests is rising or falling with  t. In particular, a 
sufficiently negatively sloped bequest motive can, under some circumstances, 
give rise to a negative demand for annuities. The after-age-65 portion of Fisch- 
er’s time profile, used here, makes b, decline approximately in step with a’  for 
a = .99 as assumed below. 
18. Friedman and Warshawsky  (1985) indicate other circumstances under 
which 8 would not be bounded. See also Abel and Warshawsky (1987) for a 
theoretical analysis in which the “joy of giving”  bequest motive assumed in 
this chapter is interpreted as the reduced form of an altruistic bequest motive 
to derive a relation between the value of the altruism parameter and the value 
of the “joy of giving”  parameter. 
19. Grossman and Shiller (1981) found evidence consistent with a relative 
risk-aversion coefficient roughly equal to 4. Bodie et al. (1985) also used this 
value. 
20.  Wealth held in annuities is valued at the present expected value. 
21.  In other words, any approximately  flat consumption stream exceeding 
3.3 percent of  initial wealth each year (7.20 percent as in column 3 of table 
2.5,  divided by 2.13) would  be preferable  to the declining stream shown in 
column 1. 
22.  Friend and Blume (1975) found evidence indicating a relative risk-aversion 
coefficient roughly equal to 2. 
23.  One-half is about the fraction of total wealth constituted by Social Se- 
curity and private  pensions  for the average retired elderly  individual in  the 
United States; see the evidence provided by Kotlikoff and Smith (1983, table 
3.7.19, p.  127). 
24.  The results shown in table 2.9 follow from searching over 8, given the 
assumed values of the other parameters. For purposes of comparison to the 
analysis by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), the 8 values corresponding to p = 
1.25 are (in order, from top to bottom in the table) 3, 2, 1, 2, 1.5, and 1. 
25.  See, for example, Kotlikoff and Summers (1981). 
26.  For males, Menchik and David (1982, table 1, p. 193) reported a median 
bequest equal to 2.1 times annual median labor income (defined as one-fortieth 
of total lifetime labor earnings), and a mean bequest equal to 4.2 times mean 
annual labor income. 
27.  See Friedman and Warshawsky (1985) for a brief discussion of several 
of these other possible explanations. 
28.  See, for example, Bernheim et al. (1985) on nonaltruistic bequests and 
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) on intrafamily risk sharing. 
29.  See, for example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
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Comment  R. Glenn Hubbard 
It is difficult to think of more important items on the research agendas 
of public finance and macroeconomics than explaining personal saving 
behavior  (especially the role  of  intergenerational transfers)  and the 
impacts of social insurance programs on national saving and individual 
welfare. With respect to both areas, it is now well recognized that, for 
all its theoretical clarity, the life-cycle model has not tested out very 
well vis-a-vis predictions about the shape of the wealth-age profile or 
the impact of pensions on the level of nonpension wealth. While there 
is evidence that  the model, in  its most general context of  forward- 
looking intertemporal optimization, is not at variance with the observed 
saving behavior of most households, many studies have concluded that 
there exists a nontrivial fraction of households for which the model 
does not appear to be an adequate description of  saving behavior. 
One element missing from most of these studies is the wealth allo- 
cation choice between assets which can be transferred to heirs upon 
death (e.g., stocks, bonds, or life insurance proceeds) and those which 
cannot (e.g., annuities). Analyses of the impact of the introduction of 
Social Security are typically conducted either under the assumption of 
a perfect private market in life annuities-in  which annuity prices are 
actuarially fair-or complete market failure in the provision of annui- 
ties. Such polar extremes are hardly innocuous.’ 
A key advance of the paper by Benjamin Friedman and Mark War- 
shawsky is its attempt to quantify the extent to which annuity contracts 
are “unfairly”  priced (in an actuarial sense). After all, the empirical 
finding that wealth-age profiles do not decline significantly in old age 
is consistent with the basic life-cycle model (when lifetime is uncertain 
and there is no bequest motive) only if there are no annuity markets. 
As Friedman and Warshawsky point out, there are well functioning life 
annuity markets in the United States, but very few individuals (in the 
present or the past) have chosen to purchase them. 
Consistent with the organization of the Friedman-Warshawsky paper, 
my comments can be divided into three parts: (i) pricing life annuities 
and computing  “load  factors,”  (ii) modeling the impact of different 
R. Glenn Hubbard is an assistant professor of economics and urban affairs at North- 
western University and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
1.  For  example, if  the prices of market  annuity contracts were actuarially fair and 
there  were no  restrictions  on the  quantities  purchased,  then  exogenous increases in 
mandatory Social Security annuities would displace annuity purchases with no effect on 
bequeathable nonpension wealth. With no market annuities, such increases would dis- 
place marketable nonpension wealth. For discussions of implications of these assump- 
tions for models of individual saving, see Bernheim (1984), Hubbard (1987), and Shesh- 
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assumptions about annuity pricing on individual saving, and (iii) con- 
sidering the implications of the modeling approach for more general 
discussions of individual saving behavior  and public policies toward 
retirement saving. 
First, Friedman and Warshawsky have made a real contribution in 
calculating the load factors associated with the purchase of life annuity 
contracts in the United  States. Their comparison of  the present ex- 
pected values of identical annuities for 65-year-old males for the “gen- 
eral population”  and “annuity  purchasers”  reveals a premium  most 
likely traceable (as they note) to the classic adverse selection problem.* 
That is, annuity prices are not actuarially fair for those individuals who 
choose to purchase life annuity  contract^.^ 
In their table 2.3, Friedman and Warshawsky present the mean load 
factors under  various assumptions.  These implied charges are sub- 
stantial, ranging up to 55 percent for individuals in the “general pop- 
ulation.”  In a particularly  interesting calculation,  they  isolate  “the 
effect of adverse selection”  by subtracting the mean load factor for 
individuals actually purchasing annuities from that for individuals in 
the general population. This calculation is not conclusive, however, as 
theoretical  treatments of adverse  selection have seldom found pure 
price equilibria to be optimal. That is, quantity rationing may occur. 
Whether such rationing is in fact important in the market for life an- 
nuities  is an empirical question, and one worthy  of  mention  in the 
paper. 
Second, the core of the Friedman-Warshawsky paper is an extension 
of Fischer’s (1973) model of the demand for life insurance to examine 
the extent to which the combination of  actuarially unfair market an- 
nuities, mandatory social annuities (e.g., Social Security), and bequest 
motives can explain observed patterns in annuity purchases and con- 
sumption in old age. The extension of the dynamic programming model 
is straightforward, and the authors use the solution expressions as the 
basis for a simulation model. 
Their modeling strategy is clever, namely, to calculate the maximum 
load factor an individual would be willing to pay to purchase market 
2.  Recent theoretical contributions to the literature on adverse selection as applied to 
annuities include Eckstein, Eichenbaum, and Peled (1985) and Judd (1984).  The Judd 
paper in particular points out the potential importance of general equilibrium analysis- 
since the annuity market equilibrium affects incentives to save, the level of savings and 
the supply of capital will be affected, altering the supply of goods and the real interest 
rate. He shows that private insurance markets afflicted  by adverse selection generally 
cannot internalize this spillover into the goods market, the competitive equilibrium will 
in general not be efficient, and that some sort of compulsory contract will be Pareto- 
improving. 
3.  In a companion paper, Friedman and Warshawsky (1985) present information on 
yield  differentials between life annuities and marketable  securities; as  with  the load 
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annuities and compare that with the actual load factors calculated ear- 
 lie^-.^ Because we do not observe many actual annuity purchases, such 
a comparison can be used to justify the appropriateness of other as- 
sumed parameter values (particularly that for the strength of the “be- 
quest motive”). The results in table 2.4 illustrate (not surprisingly) that 
the no-annuities-available and market-only-annuities cases yield coun- 
terfactual results for consumption-age and wealth-age profiles in old 
age. 
More reasonable results are obtained when Social Security annuities 
are introduced (based on the assumption that Social Security wealth 
constitutes half of total wealth). I do, however, have two reservations 
about the choice of  parameter values. First, the values used for the 
annual rate of  time preference and market rate of interest (1 percent 
for each) seem very low. We  are not told how sensitive the simulation 
results are to this choice of parameter values (in particular with respect 
to the more likely case wherein the interest rate exceeds the rate of 
time preference), though an alternative value for the market interest 
rate is reported later in table 2.9. Second, while the assumption that 
Social Security wealth and nonpension wealth are roughly equal may 
be true on average, it is certainly not true for high-income and wealthy 
cz  I 
No Annuities 
Fig. 2.2  Intertemporal budget constraints implied by no-annuity and 
perfect-annuity cases. 
4.  Friedman and Warshawsky consider the load factors on market annuities as fixed, 
“upfront” fees. An alternative approach would be to  consider  a continuous rate of return 
on annuities which is less than the actuarially fair return. Consider for simplicity a two- 
period model with consumption (Cl, CZ)  in the two periods. The intertemporal budget 
constraints implied by the no-annuity and perfect-annuity cases are illustrated in figure 
2.2. The availability of annuities expands the budget set, and compensating or equivalent 
variation calculations can be made. Actuarially unfair annuities could be considered by 
drawing an intermediate budget line between the two sketched above. Friedman and 
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individuals, for whom bequest motives are most frequently observed 
(Menchik and David  1983).5 I will discuss this point further later. 
Since across all cases prior to the introduction of bequests, the “crit- 
ical load factors”ca1culated by the model are  greater than those actually 
observed, there remains a puzzle as to why individuals are not more 
active participants in private annuity markets. The logical next step is 
to consider the extent to which planned bequests can rationalize the 
model’s predictions with observed annuity purchases.  Bequests are 
indexed by a parameter 8, which represents the ratio of a bequest to 
current annual consumption. 
Table 2.8 is most interesting in this respect, in that the inclusion of 
a bequest motive, by lowering the difference between critical and ob- 
served load factors, removes the feature of  earlier simulations that it 
is optimal to invest all non-Social-Security wealth in market annuities. 
While this modification does not yet explain the fact that almost no 
annuities are purchased by anyone in  the United States, the authors’ 
table 2.9 summarizes the model’s implications very well by calculating 
the strength of the bequest motive (again indexed by the parameter 8) 
required to eliminate market annuity purchases. 
For parameter values that seem sensible on average-say,  an interest 
rate of 4 percent, a ratio of Social Security wealth to total wealth of 
0.5, and a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2-a  relatively modest 
bequest motive (8 = 5)  is required. This still seems troublesome, how- 
ever, for any claim that a bequest motive per se is all that is needed 
to explain observed behavior in private annuity markets. Plausible in- 
creases in relative risk aversion, reductions in the market interest rate, 
or declines in  Social Security wealth relative to total wealth6 would 
require implausibly high bequest motives to eliminate annuity purchases. 
These results are even more pronounced in the calculations of the 
impact of the yield differential between annuities and government bonds. 
That differential on average is sufficient to eliminate annuity purchases 
by 65-year-old males (given a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 4 
and a ratio of “social annuities” to total wealth of 0.5) irrespective of 
any bequest motive. For lower values of the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion (e.g., 2), the combination of even lower differentials and plau- 
sible  bequest  motives  can  explain  the  absence  of  market  annuity 
purchases. 
Finally, I would like to devote the remainder of my remarks to three 
factors that may shed further light on the stimulating findings in the 
5. More subtly,  the  inclusion  of  Social  Security  annuities might  have been better 
modeled by using the entire life cycle to capture the effects of Social Security on preretire- 
ment consumption and wealth accumulation. For example, these effects would not in 
general be invariant to the way in which the system is financed. 
6. Again, such a decline in Social Security wealth relative to total wealth is perfectly 
plausible, given that it is wealthy individuals-with  comparatively little Social Security 
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Friedman-Warshawsky  paper. The first relates to the definition of an- 
nuities. While the annuities described in the paper are real annuities, 
annuities available in the market are subject to inflation risk.’ Moreover, 
when a model of the entire life cycle is considered, the lack of fungibility 
of annuities (e.g., because of problems in intertemporal reallocation of 
resources and  liquidity  constraints) may  be important. Other “con- 
tracts” not considered in the analysis might act as proxies for market 
annuities, namely, private pension annuitiesX  (Hubbard 1987)  or implicit 
intrafamily  contracting arrangements (Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak 
1987). These added considerations could account for some remaining 
annuity purchases in the presence of a bequest motive in table 2.8, or 
for a lower bequest motive required in table 2.9 to “eliminate” market 
annuity purchases (by augmenting “exogenous”  annuities relative to 
total wealth). 
Second, two modeling considerations might increase the robustness 
of the results. Solving for steady-state values of national  saving and 
individual welfare  would permit  comparison of the impacts of alter- 
native “social  annuity” policies on individual welfare given different 
assumptions about bequest motives. In addition, it would be useful to 
know the size of bequests relative to life-cycle  resources implied by 
the values in table 2.9. Such calculations  could  shed additional  light 
on the importance of intergenerational transfers in accounting for the 
size of the capital stock. 
Finally, and most important, the ultimate relevance of the simulation 
exercises depends on the extent to which lifetime uncertainty is the 
dominant form of uncertainty present in  individual consumption op- 
timization problems. I am reminded of the cry by Maggie in Tennessee 
Williams’s Cat on a Hot Tin Roof: “You can be young without money, 
but you can’t be old without money.” 
Uncertainty in old age is a general phenomenon. While there is no 
doubt that uncertain longevity is important, one can easily imagine 
that uncertainty over health or disability is a significant worry for the 
elderl~.~  That is, “uncertainty” broadly defined may account for stable 
wealth-age  profiles  in retirement. For  example, Friedman and War- 
shawsky point out that market annuities have never been very signif- 
icant in the United States, yet the past two generations of Americans 
have witnessed a dramatic expansion in the coverage and generosity 
of the Social Security and private pension systems. Extrapolating from 
7.  It is not clear, for example, that individuals prefer real (market) annuities given the 
8.  In addition, private pension annuities receive favorable tax treatment relative to 
9.  See the discussion in Diamond and Hausman (1984). 
existing structure of Social Security benefits (Feldstein 1983). 
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table 2.9, an implausibly high bequest motive would have been required 
to eliminate life annuity purchases.lO 
Recent papers on the influence of lifetime uncertainty on national 
saving and this contribution by Friedman and Warshawsky suggest the 
importance of recognizing and modeling the effects of uncertainty on 
individual saving decisions and the size of the capital stock. Measuring 
the size of uncertainty saving may help to reconcile the life-cycle model 
with  observed  saving behavior  and to reevaluate  the importance of 
intergenerational transfers for the size of the capital stock (as in Kotli- 
koff and Summers 1981). Such an approach will facilitate welfare anal- 
yses of  social insurance  programs and complementary  private  pro- 
grams.  Finally,  data permitting,  cross-country  comparisons  of  the 
influence of social and private annuities on the capital stock would be 
useful in empirically disentangling motivations for saving behavior. 
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